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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OFTHESTATEOFUTAH 
ANITA J. ROBINSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
Case No. 15331 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UT AH, 
Defendant-Respondent 
Defendant's Brief 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah pursuant to Section 
35-4-IO(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, seeking judicial review of a decision of 
the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, which denied Plaintiff 
unemployment compensation for a period of six weeks. 
DISPOSITION BY THE BOARD OF REVIEW 
Plaintiff was initially allowed unemployment compensation without disqualification by 
a Department Representative. After a hearing resulting from an appeal by the employer, 
University of Utah, the Appeal Referee reversed the Department Representative and denied 
benefits for six weeks, from February 20, 1977, to April 2, 1977, on the grounds Plaintiff 
left work voluntarily without good cause. The Board of Review affirmed the decision of the 
Appeal Referee in Case No. 77-A-954, 77-BR-80, dated June 22, 1977. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decisions of the Board of Review and the Appeal Referee, 
and requests the Court to declare Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, invalid insofar as it chills the exercise of religious and other freedoms guaranteed 
by the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Utah. Defendant seeks affirmance 
of the decision of the Board of Review and the Appeal Referee. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff became employed with the University of Utah on September 21, 1976, as a 
secretary-stenographer. (R.0019, 0027, 0028, 0047) At the time of her hire the Plaintiff was 
also employed by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (R.0028), where she worked 
from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m., Monday through Friday. (R0024, 0028) The Plaintiff's 
workday at the University of Utah was to begin at 11 :00 a.m. (R.0019) or 11 :30 a.m. 
(R.0025) each day. Whenever Plaintiff worked overtime she was subsequently given 
overtime pay or compensable time off. (R.0029, 0037) Plaintiff's last day of actual work for 
the University of Utah was on January 31, 1977. She took leave without pay on February l 
and 3, 1977, and did not report for work on Februay 4, 1977. (R.0020) By Jetter dated 
February 3, 1977, Plaintiff was advised she would be terminated as of February 17, 1977, 
because of the unsatisfactory quality of her work. (R.0022) On February 7, 1977, Plaintiff 
verbally advised the Dean's Office where she worked that she would submit a letter of 
resignation. (R.0021, 0032) 
Plaintiff had agreed at the time of her hire to work for the Bureau of Reclamation only 
until she qualified for placement on a permanent roster, a period of time expected to take 
about four months. (R.0019, 0022, 0029) Despite this agreement and the fact she actually 
commenced termination procedures with the Bureau of Reclamation, Plaintiff decided some 
time in December 1976 to retain her part-time employment with the Bureau rather than her 
full-time job with the University. (R.0040, 0041) 
Although unemployment benefits were initially allowed without disqualification based 
on Plaintiff's statements, (R.0047) it was later found by an Appeal Referee that Plaintiff's 
2 
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working conditions were not in violation of her working agreement or in any way 
substandard. (R.0018) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT IN REVIEWING A DETERMINATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COM-
MISSION UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL 
AFFIRM THE COMMISSION FINDINGS IF SUCH ARE SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases is well established. Section 
35-4-IO(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953; Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 Ut. 2d 131, 477 P. 
2d 587 (1970). This court has consistently held that where the findings of the Commission 
are supported by evidence, they will not be disturbed. Members of Iron Workers Union of 
Provo v. Industrial Commission, 104 Ut. 242, 139 P. 2d 208. A reversal of an order of the 
Department denying compensation can only be justified if there is no substantial evidence to 
sustain the determination and the facts giving rise to a right to compensation are so 
persuasive that the Department's denial is clearly capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable. 
Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Security, 13 Ut. 
2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 (1962); Gocke v. Wiesley, 18 Ut. 2d 245, 420 P. 2d 44 (1966). 
POINT II 
THAT THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT IS TO BE LIBERALLY CON-
STRUED TO ACCOMPLISH ITS OBJECTS BUT SUCH RULE DOES NOT 
PERMIT AN EXTENSION OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION TO 
ONE WHOSE INITIAL UNEMPLOYMENT MAY BE VOLITIONAL. 
Section 35-4-5(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended, provides: 
5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing 
a waiting period: (a) For the week in which he has left work voluntarily without 
good cause, if so found by the commission, and for not less than one or more 
than the five next following weeks, as determined by the commission according 
to the circumstances in each case, provided that when such individual has had no 
bona fide employment between the week in which he voluntarily left such work 
without good cause and the week in which he filed for benefits he shall be so dis-
qualified for the week in which he filed for benefits and for not less than one or 
more than the five next following weeks. 
3 
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It is a generally acknowledged rule that Employment Security statutes are construed 
liberally to accomplish their purposes and objectives. However, in Utah and elsewhere the 
courts construe such statutes in a manner which distinguishes those petitioning as 
beneficiaries of the Act who become unemployed for reasons attributable to themselves. 
This court has previously pointed out that the purpose of the Employment Security Act is to 
assist the worker and his family in times when he is out of work without fault on his part. 
Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Security, supra. 
The court has also noted that the underlying legislative intent of the various disqualifying 
provisions of the Act is that the Department is to determine a claimant's eligiblity for 
unemployment compensation by adhering to the volitional test, and declared the policy of 
the contributions provisions of the statute to be to establish financial reserves for the benefit 
of persons unemployed through no fault of their own. Olaf Nelson Construction Company 
v. Industrial Commission, 121 Ut. 521, 243 P. 2d 951 (1952). 
This court has recently held that: 
The initial determination of "good cause," for voluntarily leaving employment 
is a mixed question of law and fact for the administrative agency. A claimant 
has the burden of showing good cause for leaving, when he voluntarily terminates 
suitable employment. "Good cause" has been defined as "such cause as would 
similarly affect persons of reasonable and normal sensitivity, and is limited to 
those instances where the unemployment is caused by external pressures· so com-
pelling that a reasonably prudent person, exercising ordinary common sense 
and prudence, would be justified in quitting under similar circumstances." Denby 
v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, (Utah) 567 P. 2d 630 
(1977). (Citations omitted.) 
There is no dispute as to the fact Plaintiff left her work with the University of Utah 
voluntarily. Although the employer sent a letter dated February 3, 1977, to Plaintiff 
advising she would be terminated as of February 17, 1977, (R.0022) Plaintiff had not 
appeared for work for the two prior days, (R.0020) and called the employer on February 7, 
1977, verbally advising that she would submit a letter of resignation. (R.0021) Furthermore, 
at no point in her appeal has Plaintiff alleged her termination was a discharge rather than a 
voluntary quit. The question to be determined by this appeal is whether or not the Plaintiff 
had good cause in so leaving. 
The applicable standards to determine "good cause" are standards of reasonable~ 
ness, and the question of good cause is to be determined from the circumstances of each 
4 
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individual case. Stevenson v. Morgan, 17 Or. App. 428, 522 P. 2d 1204, 1206 (1974); Wilton 
v. Employment Division, 26 Or. App. 549, 553 P. 2d 1071 (1976). That Plaintiff's reasons 
for leaving her employment under the particular circumstances of her case do not fall within 
the standards of "good cause" as set forth in the Denby case, supra, is evident from the 
record, as will be shown in Point III herein. 
POINT III 
THE FINDINGS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND THE APPEAL 
REFEREE THAT PLAINTIFF LEFT WORK VO LUNT ARIL Y WITHOUT 
GOOD CAUSE ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND 
ARE CONCLUSIVE. 
a. THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND APPEAL REFEREE DID NOT ERR 
IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO SUNDAY WORK 
WAS NOT DUE TO A STRONG RELIGIOUS CONVICTION. 
b. THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND APPEAL REFEREE DID NOT ERR 
IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO VOTE WAS NOT IN-
FRINGED BY THE EMPLOYER. 
c. THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND APPEAL REFEREE DID NOT ERR 
IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S WORKING CONDITIONS DID NOT 
VIOLATE HER WORK AGREEMENT AND WERE NOT SUB-
STANDARD. 
d. THE APPEAL REFEREE AND BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR 
IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PURSUE AVAILABLE 
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES. 
Plaintiff contends that she had good cause for leaving work on three grounds: (1) the 
employer infringed her fundamental right to freedom of religion; (2) the employer in-
fringed Plaintiff's fundamental right to vote; and (3) Plaintiff was subjected by her em-
ployer to harrassment and unreasonable working conditions. Defendant concurs that any 
one of the foregoing conditions could, where existing in appropriate circumstances, 
constitute "good cause" for voluntarily leaving work, such as would justify a finding of 
eligibility for unemployment compensation. 
a. THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND APPEAL REFEREE DID NOT ERR 
IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO SUNDAY WORK 
WAS NOT DUE TO A STRONG RELIGIOUS CONVICTION. 
A Department Representative found at the initial stage of Plaintiff's filing for benefits 
that she was required to work Sundays "against the conditions of her hire & rel. 
5 
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conviction." (R.0047. See also Plaintiff's Brief, p. 10) That such a finding is not conclusive 
as to the Appeal Referee or Board of Review is evident from the fact that proceedings 
before the Appeal Referee and Board of Review are de nova. Section 35-4-IO(b) and (d) (2), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. See also Continental Oil Company v. Board of 
Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, (Utah) 568 P. 2d 727 (1977). 
In contrast to the conclusion of the Department Representative that Plaintiff left work 
because she was required to work on Sunday in violation of the conditions of her hire and 
religious convictions, the Appeal Referee found that Plaintiff's objection to Sunday work 
was not motivated by a strong religious belief. Such a finding has ample support in the 
record. 
There is direct testimonial evidence that at her initial employment interview Plaintiff 
agreed to work on Sundays. (R.0019) In addition the Plaintiff requested that she be allowed 
to work on one Sunday: 
Ms. Leininger: " ... and then there was another Sunday that she wanted to 
work and said there was no problem, church or otherwise. And 
I said well now and I'd respected all the way through and any-
time she didn't want to and she said no this was the time because 
she had been gone and she wanted to take a weekend and she'd 
be back and she'd like to work when it was quiet (sic)." 
Referee: "So this, then, this work on Sunday was at her option?" 
Ms. Leininger: "This was the agreement." (R.0029, 0030) 
Plaintiff's testimony at the hearing is substantially the same, although she contended that 
the reason for asking to work on Sunday was so she could move to a new apartment that 
Saturday: 
Ms. Robinson: "Ok. For this reason I adjusted to her needs to have someone 
come in on the weekend and I came, or requested to come in 
on Sunday rather than Saturday, although this was still an in-
convenience as I would to me because I still did not finish my 
moving since I had had to work on Sunday ... " (R.0035) 
Plaintiff explained her objection to Sunday work in the following manner: 
Referee: 
Ms. Robinson 
"Now then, uh, what is your objection to Sunday work?" 
"Ok, It's for religious purposes. I think that if the Lord had 
said has said it is a day of rest and I personally believe that no 
matter what religion we are, whether its, uh, a requirement of the 
church we go to, whether our church tells us to, I believe per-
sonally that it is a day of rest and shouldn't be used for work 
6 
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Referee: 
Ms. Robinson: 
"However, you had worked on Sundays before, had you not?" 
"No, I had not. I may have worked one other Sunday, and I, 
that may have been all. But, uh, I never did work any other 
Sundays." (R.0025) 
In her five months of employment with the University of Utah, Plaintiff was asked 
to work one Sunday and requested that she be allowed to work another Sunday. (R.0035) 
Plaintiff was also asked to work Sunday, January 30, 1977, to which she agreed. However, 
she failed to appear for work. That her employer was not critical of the failure to work on 
Sunday in and of itself, but rather, because the failure typified an attitude on the part of 
Plaintiff, is evident from the record. (See letter dated January 31, 1977, by Dean Leininger. 
R.0024) Despite Plaintiff's protestations to the contrary, the Appeal Referee and Board of 
Review could have reasonably concluded from the foregoing evidence that Plaintiff's 
reluctance to work on Sunday was not motivated by strong religious conviction. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff was aware of the grievance procedure available to her but 
failed to pursue the matter after contacting the Employee Relations Representative of the 
University, as will be more fully detailed at the conclusion of this Point. 
In support of her contention of denial of religious freedom, Plaintiff cites Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed. 2d 965 (1963). As the applicability of 
Sherbert to the instant case is fully discussed in Point IV herein, further discussion will not 
be undertaken at this juncture. 
b. THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND APPEAL REFEREE DID NOT ERR 
IN FINDING THAT PLANTIFF'S RIGHT TO VOTE WAS NOT IN-
FRINGED BY THE EMPLOYER. 
Plaintiff alleges an infringement of her right to vote. While the Appeal Referee made 
no specific findings as to this allegation, he could reasonably have concluded it was with-
out merit in view of the facts that Plaintiff did vote on that particular occasion (R.0034) and 
that Plaintiff made no apparent effort to obtain time off from her morning employ-
ment. (R.0034) The Appeal Referee properly rejected Plaintiff's testimony that " ... it 
would have been far too distance (sic) to travel and work at the University in the 
afternoon." (R.0034) in light of the Plaintiff's testimony that she was able to drive from the 
University to the polling place in less than ten minutes, and the testimony of Dean Leininger 
7 
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that Plaintiff sometimes did not appear for work at the University until 1 :30 or 2:00 p.m. 
(R.0031) 
Had Plaintiff been delayed so as to have been unable to exercise her right of suffarage, 
she may very well have been justified in leaving the job. And, in fact, Plaintiff stated in a 
memorandum to the Board of Review: 
The point is that if I had not been able to vote (I made it at the last minute) I 
would have quit that very next day. (R.0012) 
Plaintiff did not quit at that time, however, and did not even attempt to file a grievance, 
of which more will be said at the conclusion of this Point. 
c. THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND APPEAL REFEREE DID NOT ERR 
IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S WORKING CONDITIONS DID NOT 
VIOLATE HER WORK AGREEMENT AND WERE NOT SUBSTANDARD. 
Plaintiff's final factual allegation is that she left work because of harrassment and 
unreasonable working conditions. With respect to the charge of unreasonable working 
conditions, the record reflects that Plaintiff did indeed work odd hours as compared to 
the usual 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. workday which is common in the business community. 
She was also asked to work some weekends, as previously discussed. However, the unusual 
hours were, at least to a large extent, due to Plaintiff's request at her initial employ-
ment interview that she be allowed to work from 11 :00 or 11 :30 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. to 
accommodate a temporary part-time job. (R.0019, 0020, 0025, 0028, 0031) There were 
indeed occasions when Plaintiff was requested to work beyond 7:00 p.m. (R.0028, 0029, 
0035, 0040) However, she did receive overtime pay or compensable time off, (R.0029, 0031, 
0037, 0047) and such extra work was with her consent. (R.0031, 0032, 0037) 
Relative to Plaintiff's complaint of harrassment, the record shows that Plaintiff did 
receive a letter establishing a thirty-day evaluation period, (R.0025), a letter concerning 
working hours and other matters, (R.0023) and a letter giving Plaintiff two weeks' notice 
(R.0022) There were also verbal discussions with Plaintiff about her work performance 
and tardiness. (R.0022) The evidence, taken as a whole, overwhelmingly supports the 
finding of the Referee and Board of Review that the working hours and conditions were not 
in violation of Plaintiff's working agreement or substandard. Indeed, the reason for the 
8 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
---
letters to and discussions with Plaintiff were the result of inadequate performance by 
Plaintiff. In a letter dated as early as November 30, 1976, Plaintiff was advised: 
During the .next 30 days, I will again be reviewing to see if your typing and 
shorthand improve as there have been several typographical and obvious 
spelling, grammar, etc., errors in some of the letters. I hope that such errors 
can be reduced and that the quality of your work will rather noticeably im-
prove as well as the quantity of work ... I have actually found that when 
you work on Saturday with me, and you have not worked an extra half day 
(your other position), that the quality of your work is better, as well as your 
attitude. I suspect that you are overcommitted and are finding it difficult to 
maintain two jobs and adjust to two settings. (R.0025) 
Plaintiff's supervisor, Dean Leininger, summarized the relationship with Plaintiff in 
her testimony: 
Ms. Leininger: So that she was inconsistent on this and I think that we are 
constantly, I must say all our staff were constantly adjusting 
to her personal needs. Uh, we tried very hard to, uh, and I was 
hoping that with her skills and that maybe she could advance 
herself, but, uh, she was inconcistent all the way through. 
(R.0033) 
Thus, there appears to be an abundance of evidence in the record showing that rather 
than harrassing Plaintiff, the employer made a prolonged, conscientious attempt to work 
with the Plaintiff by adjusting work schedules and having several discussions with Plain-
tiff, rather than terminating her earlier in the relationship. 
d. THE APPEAL REFEREE AND BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR 
IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PURSUE AVAILABLE 
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES. 
It is undisputed that a claimant for unemployment compensation has good cause for 
leaving work when the facts disclose abridgment of religious freedom, denial of the right of 
suffrage, or undue harrassment. However, even where such conditions exist, it is first 
incumbent on a claimant to make some effort to resolve the problems before terminat-
ing from gainful employment. This court has previously held: 
Furthermore, in order to have good cause for leaving work, an employee 
with grievances about his employment must indicate an effort to work out 
the problems, unless he can demonstrate that such effort would be futile. 
Denby v. Board of Review, supra. 
Plaintiff was aware of the grievance procedure available to her and even contacted the 
University Employee Relations Representative about her concern for working on Sunday. 
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(R.0032, 0039) Plaintiff contends that it would have been futile to continue with the 
grievance procedure, and quotes Plaintiff's testimony before the Appeal Referee to the 
effect that Plaintiff was given to believe she would still be required to work on Sundays. 
(See Plaintiff's Brief, pp. 9, 10.) 
Plaintiff's testimony on this point is in direct conflict with that of Mr. Hubbard, the 
Employee Relations Representative for the University of Utah: 
Referee: 
Mr. Hubbard: 
Referee: 
Mr. Hubbard: 
Referee: 
Mr. Hubbard: 
Referee: 
Mr. Hubbard: 
Fine. I think that pretty well covers the circumstances. Mr. Hub-
bard, do you have anything further you'd like to add? 
I really don't, in terms of, uh, basic issues involved, except to say 
that, uh, Anita called me, uhm. sometime before this February 
4th date and complained of having to, uh, work on Sunday 
against her will. 
Uh-huh. 
And I said "well, uh, there is a, uh, law I believe that would, uh, 
support you, you know, that you don't have to work on Sunday 
if it is your Sabbath day, uh. I will research to find out, but in the 
meantime I'd like for you, if you wish to, uh, file a grievance, 
to put that grievance in writing so we can, you know." 
Did she ever reduce that to writing? 
No, she did not and, uh, in fact she called me at home, uh, on 
two occasions. One to further discuss the situation and a second 
time to say to me that she did not want to follow through on the 
grievance. 
Uh-huh. 
Uh, I could not really continue with claim of, uh, some kind of 
injustice or unfairness on the job without having something re-
duced to writing. That's not necessary, but in this situation, uh, 
because she was a probationary employee and she could be re-
leased with little or no cause, uh, I felt that it would be proper to 
have that in writing so that she will have a commitment on the 
record. (R.0032) 
Had Plaintiff in fact held the "strong belief" she alleges, it seems only reasonable that she 
pursue the grievance procedure available to her rather than giving up certain em-
ployment. 
In support of her contention that such action would have been futile, Plaintiff relies on 
the case of Glennen v. Employment Division, (Or. App.) 549 P. 2d 1288 (1976). The 
Glennen case is directly in point because the Oregon Court of Appeals specifically held that 
the claimant therein failed to demonstrate an effort to work out problems would be futile, 
and therefore affirmed the denial of unemployment benefits. In weighing the testimony and 
relative interests of the two parties, the Appeal Referee in the instant case reasonably 
concluded that the Plaintiff failed to pursue the grievance by her own choice, and not 
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because she had been dissuaded from it. 
The record is totally devoid of any evidence that Plaintiff attempted to pursue a grievance 
with respect to the occasion when she felt she was deliberately delayed in trying to vote, or 
with respect to the alleged harrassment. The record reflects only one occasion when Plaintiff 
inquired about the hours she was working: 
... She (plaintiff) wondered why she had to work until 7:30 or 8:00 and Ms. 
Lynch said that this was her arrangement to accommodate her other job and 
that she worked later because she started later and Ms. Robinson agreed 
(R.0020) 
Based on the foregoing evidence the Appeal Referee rightly concluded that the Plaintiff 
made no effort to work out her alleged grievances and failed to demonstrate that such an 
effort would have been futile. 
POINT IV 
SECTION 35-4-5(a), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, IS 
NOT VIOLATIVE OF THIS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS 
OF SUFFRAGE AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION. 
Plaintiff requests the court to declare invalid Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotat-
ed 1953, as amended, on the grounds said provision has a "chilling" effect on the exercise 
of religious and other freedoms. In support of this proposition, Plaintiff cites Sherbert v. 
Verner, supra. The Sherbert case arose when a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist 
Church was discharged by her South Carolina employer because she refused to work on 
Saturday, which is the Sabbath Day of her faith. Upon discharge, she filed for unemploy-
ment compensation and was denied benefits on the grounds she restricted her availability 
for work by refusing to work on Saturdays. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that, 
as a matter of law, the denial of benefits infringed no constitutional rights because it did not 
prevent her from observing her religious beliefs. The facts of the case were that appellant 
became a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church in 1957, when her employer did not 
require her to work on Saturday. In 1959 the employer imposed the requirement of 
Saturday work. It was specifically noted in the court's opinion that no challenge was made 
concerning the sincerity of the appellant's religious beliefs. See Footnote 1, 83 S. Ct. 1791. 
The U.S. Supreme Court found that the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court 
left the appellant no alternative but to either forego unemployment benefits or work on the 
day of her Sabbath: 
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The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her 
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the 
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. (At 83 S. 
Ct. 1794.) 
The court also found that the South Carolina statutory scheme exempted Sunday 
worshippers from being required to work on Sunday. (Although, see Footnote 3, 83 S. Ct. 
1803.) 
It is a basic rule of construction that legislative enactments and administrative 
regulations made thereunder are to be construed in such a manner as to preserve their 
constitutionality or validity. 16 Corpus Juris Secundum, Constitutional Law, Section 98. 
"Good cause" for leaving work has been interpreted to include a good faith leaving on 
religious grounds. General Rules of Adjudication, Voluntary Leaving, Section 90. 
Defendant readily concedes that if Plaintiff in fact holds a sincere religious conviction 
which prohibits her by reason of conscience from working on Sunday, that a denial of 
unemployment benefits resulting from her refusal to work on Sunday would violate the free 
exercise clause of the First Amendment. Such a denial would also be contrary to the 
aforementioned interpretive rule. Thus, the issue in this regard is not whether Section 5(a) 
of the Utah Employment Security Act violates the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment, but rather is there substantial evidence to support the finding of the Referee 
that Plaintiff's objection to Sunday work was not the product of a strong religious belief. 
The court in Sherbert, supra, did not consider the question of the sincerity of Appellant's 
religious belief because no question was raised concerning it. However, it must be 
considered that sincerity of religious belief, or lack thereof, can be an appropriate factual 
issue in such cases because to hold otherwise would permit any unemployment insurance 
claimant who chooses to voluntarily leave work to avoid the statutory penalty by claiming a 
religious privilege. For that reason the Department, in carrying out its administrative 
responsibilities by promulgating Section 90, Voluntary Leaving, of the General Rules of 
Adjudication, included the qualifying phrase "an individual who in good faith refuses or 
leaves employment .... "(emphasis added.) That the Department and this court may look 
beyond the claim of abridgement of religious freedom is clear. Although few cases could he 
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located on this point which directly involve unemployment insurance, one case in which 
unemployment benefits were allowed involved undisputed evidence of the claimant's 
sincerity of belief, as in the Sherbert case, supra. Syrek v. California Unemployment 
Insurance Appeals Board, 54 Cal. 2d 519, 354 P. 2d 625, 633 (1960). In the Syrek case the 
California Supreme Court explained the extent of its holding by saying: 
.... We do hold that when an applicant declines to take the oath and states 
his own conscientious objection to the taking, and there is no finding that his 
stated objection is a sham for the purpose of avoiding work or is otherwise 
false, the applicant may not be denied such unemployment insurance bene-
fits as would otherwise be payable. 
Several cases under the Universal Military Training and Service Act have considered 
the sincerity of the appellant's religious belief. The First Circuit Court of Appeals succinct-
ly stated the issue in the case of Weightman v. United States, 142 F. 2d 188 (1944): 
By granting the favor of exemption from military service to conscientious ob-
jectors without requiring membership in a presently organized and well-
recognized religious sect or organization whose existing creed forbids its 
members to participate in war of any form ... Congress raised a serious 
practical problem for those entrusted with the administration of the Act be-
cause it required investigation of personal, not group beliefs - a matter which 
can easily be falsified without detection. If conscientious objectors should 
simply be excused from the burden of military duty cast upon other men ... 
no doubt some, maybe many, men would falsely profess conscientious ob-
jections only to obtain the privileged status of exemption. 
In a more recent Selective Service case the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that an 
order for the appellant to perform alternative service by working in a hospital did not 
infringe the free exercise of religion because appellant had previously worked in a hospital. 
United States v. Boardman, 419 F. 2d 110, 113 (1969). Although these cases arose under a 
Federal statute involving the question of a compelling governmental interest, which is not 
alleged in the instant case, the analogy between the Boardman case and Plaintiff's case is 
readily apparent. 
Finally, it should be noted that one alleging infringement of the First Amendment free 
exercise clause has the burden "to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates 
against him in the practice of his religion." Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 
222, 223, 8 S. Ct. 1560 (1962); Jones v. Butz, (S. D. New York) 374 F. Supp. 1284 (1974). 
Thus, in the Sherbert case, supra, the court held that the State Supreme Court ruling forced 
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the claimant to choose between giving up her right to unemployment benefits or abandoning 
one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work; in the instant case no such 
coercive effect exists because the Plaintiff agreed to work on one Sunday, requested to work 
on another Sunday, and failed to pursue grievance procedures available to her had she in 
fact wished not to work on Sunday for reasons of religion. 
CONCLUSION 
The claim of Plaintiff that a denial of unemployment benefits violates the free exercise 
of religion clause of the First Amendment was properly rejected by the Appeal Referee and 
the Board of Review in the face of evidence that the Plaintiff's religious belief did not 
prevent her from agreeing to work on one occasion and actually requesting to work on 
another. The findings of the Board of Review and Referee that Plaintiff was not prevented 
from voting are supported by the evidence of record. The record also contains ample 
support for the finding the Plaintiff's working conditions were within the terms of the 
employment agreement, which terms were set in large part at Plaintiff's request because of 
her desire to maintain a second employment while working full time for the University of 
Utah, and that Plaintiff was not unduly harrassed by her employer. 
Plaintiff by her own admission did not try to resolve any grievances she may have had 
through available grievance procedures and has failed to show that such an effort would 
have been futile. Therefore, the decision of the Board of Review should be affirmed and 
benefits denied accordingly. 
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